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Tiivistelmä 
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ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT OE RADIONUCLIDES 
FOLLOWING A HYPOTHETICAL REACTOR ACCIDENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Considerable amounts of man-made radioactivity have been transported to the Arctic 
environment since the start of the nuclear era in 1945. There has been a variety of 
sources contributing to this: nuclear weapons tests, the 1986 Chernobyl accident, liquid 
and atmospheric emissions from the nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in Sellafield and 
Dounreay, the United Kingdom, La Hague, France, operational and accidental liquid 
and atmospheric emissions from the nuclear weapons production and fuel reprocessing 
facilities in Russia (Chelyabinsk, Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk), Soviet dumping of nuclear 
waste and used reactors to the Arctic Ocean. Local contamination has occurred due to 
accidents involving aircrafts carrying nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered vessels and the 
handling of their fuel cycle. Especially important of these has been the Novaya Zemlya 
nuclear test site. The Soviet Union conducted there 91 nuclear tests in the atmosphere, 
ground surface and water in 1955-1962 including the most powerful atmospheric 
nuclear test ever ("Tsar Bomba" or "Big Ivan", 50-58 megatons) on 30 October 1961 
(Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2010). The most recent source of 
artificial radioactivity transported to the Arctic is the 2011 Fukushima accident (Paatero 
2et al., 2012). 
 
Two new nuclear facilities are being planned in or close to the Arctic. A construction of 
a nuclear power plant to Pyhäjoki, western Finland, is under preparation. The 
Shtokmann natural gas production field in the Barents Sea could be powered with 
floating nuclear reactors according to Russian plans. Atmospheric transport modeling 
was applied to study the potential risks of hypothetical accidents in these plants. The 
resulting atmospheric concentrations of radioactivity were compared to those that 
occurred in Finland in the 1960s due to the atmospheric nuclear tests. This work is part 
of the project "Collaboration Network on EuroArctic Environmental Radiation 
Protection and Research (CEEPRA)", www.ceepra.eu. 
 
 
COMPUTATIONAL AND EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
 
Transport modeling 
 
Dispersion of radionuclides was simulated with the System for Integrated modeLling of 
Atmospheric coMposition SILAM (Sofiev et al., 2006, 2008). The dynamic core of the 
model is based on the transport scheme of Galperin (1999, 2000) combined with the 
extended resistance analogy of Sofiev (2002) for vertical diffusion. The model was 
driven by ECMWF meterorological forecast data and configured at a horizontal 
resolution of 0.25 degrees and with 9 vertical levels reaching height of 7700 m. 
 
Wet and dry deposition as well as radioactive decay are included as loss processes. Wet 
deposition is computed using scavenging coefficients based primarily on the data of 
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Horn et al. (1987), Smith and Clark (1989) and Jylhä (1991). Dry deposition is 
modelled using the resistance approach (Hicks et al., 1987; Lindfors et al., 1993). 
 
The assumptions concerning the hypothetical Pyhäjoki and Barents Sea accidents are 
listed in Tables 1 and 2. Transport and dispersion calculations with the SILAM model 
were made for every day of the year 2010. Cumulative deposition after 48 hours and 48 
hour average activity concentration in the ground-level air of four nuclides, 90Sr, 131I, 
137Cs, and 241Pu, were calculated. Based on these calculation average activity 
concentration and deposition situations were produced. In addition, one reference case 
for Pyhäjoki with a slightly higher release fraction (2 %) and the atmospheric transport 
lasting 120 hours was calculated. The accident parameters and source term in the case 
of Pyhäjoki power reactor were as follows: 
o Site Pyhäjoki, Finland 64°32’N, 24°15’E, 
o Pressurized water reactor, thermal power 4000 MW, 
o End of the refueling interval, 
o Instant release after shutdown, and 
o Effective release height 200 m above sea level. 
 
The accident parameters and source term in the case of the floating nuclear reactor were 
as follows: 
o Site Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea 73°N, 44°E, 
o Ice breaker reactor, 
o Burnup of 466000 MWdays/ T HM, 
o Instant release two hours after shutdown, 
o Nuclide inventory from Reistad and Ølgaard (2006), and 
o Effective release height 100 m above sea level. 
 
Table 1. Source term for the Pyhäjoki accident scenario. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nuclide Inventory Release Release 
 Bq fraction, % Bq 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sr-90 3.9E17 0.1 3.9E14 
I-131 3.9E18 3.0 1.17E17 
Cs-137 5.2E17 1.5 7.8E15 
Pu-241 6.2E17 0.1 6.2E14 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 2. Source term for the Shtokmann accident scenario. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nuclide Inventory Release Release 
 Bq fraction, % Bq 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sr-90 8.68E15 0.2 1.74E13 
I-131 4.54E16 1.0 4.54E14 
Cs-137 8.83E15 1.0 8.83E13 
Pu-241 3.20E14 0.2 6.40E11 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Experimental work 
 
Finnish Meteorological Institute has collected weekly aerosol samples at its regional 
office at the Rovaniemi airport since 1965 (Fig. 1). The samples were measured for 
long-lived beta activity and then archived for future use. For this project these samples 
were retrieved from the filter archive. Metadata of the samples, especially air volumes, 
were collected from station logbooks. The 137Cs content of the samples were measured 
with semiconductor gamma spectrometry at the Finnish Meteorological Institute and at 
the Laboratory of Radiochemistry, University of Helsinki. Additional data was obtained 
from STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Regional Laboratory in Northern 
Finland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Aerosol sampling station at the Rovaniemi airport, regional office of the FMI. 
The arrow points to the sampling inlet on the roof of the building. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Transport and deposition from the Pyhäjoki site 
 
Prevailing weather conditions have a crucial effect on the dispersion of the atmospheric 
emissions caused by a nuclear power plant accident. The direction of air flows settles 
the course of the emission plume. On one hand, the wind speed determines how quickly 
the emission plume is moving on. On the other hand, the wind speed determines also the 
vertical and horizontal dispersion of the plume, which affects the concentrations of 
radioactive substances. In turn, precipitation efficiently scavenges the radioactivity from 
the atmosphere to the ground, affecting the amount of the radioactive deposition. The 48 
hours' average activity concentrations of 90Sr, 131I, 137Cs, and 241Pu in the ground-level 
air for the Pyhäjoki site are depicted in Figures 2-5. Corresponding deposition maps are 
depicted in Figures 6-9. On average the activity concentration and deposition values 
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decrease rapidly as the distance from the accident site increases. However, individual 
cases differ considerably. Depending on wind conditions and occurrence of rain the 
radioactive release plume can affect areas from North Atlantic Ocean to Ural 
mountains. In a calm weather situation, on the other hand, the effects might remain 
quite local (Figures 10-14). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 48 hour average activity concentration of 90Sr in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 48 hour average activity concentration of 131I in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases.  
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Figure 4. 48 hour average activity concentration of 137Cs in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. 48 hour average activity concentration of 241Pu in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases.  
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Figure 6. Cumulative deposition of 90Sr 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident at 
Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Cumulative deposition of 131I 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident at 
Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases.  
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Figure 8. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Cumulative deposition of 241Pu 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Pyhäjoki, average of 365 cases.  
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Figure 10. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Pyhäjoki, case 7 May 2010.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Pyhäjoki, case 29 January 2010.  
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Figure 12. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Pyhäjoki, case 17 July 2010.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Pyhäjoki, case 10 January 2010.  
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Figure 14. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Pyhäjoki, case 1 June 2010.  
 
 
Transport and deposition from the Shtokmann site 
 
The average activity concentrations of 90Sr, 131I, 137Cs, and 241Pu in the ground-level air 
for the floating nuclear reactor are depicted in Figures 15-18. Corresponding deposition 
maps are depicted in Figures 19-22. Again, the average values decrease quite rapidly as 
the distance from the release point increases. From the northern Finland point of view 
even in the worst case the radioactive deposition in northern Finland would remain 
rather low. With the accident parameters described earlier the 90Sr deposition would be, 
on average, less than the deposition caused by the atmospheric nuclear tests of the 
1950s and the early 1960s (Paatero et al. 2010). 
 
Comparison of SILAM and SNAP model results 
 
The SILAM model results were compared to the SNAP model operated by the 
Norwegian Meteorological Institute (Bartnicki et al., 2011) using same cases and source 
terms. Both Pyhäjoki and Barents Sea accidents were analysed. This way the results of 
both models could be compared and some conclusions formulated, also about the 
uncertainty of the simulations. Same forecast length was used but the meteorological 
data used as well as the model domains were different. Also the output from both 
models is slightly different, but still the most important feature can be compared. 
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Figure 15. 48 hour average activity concentration of 90Sr in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases. 
 
 
Figure 16. 48 hour average activity concentration of 131I in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases.  
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Figure 17. 48 hour average activity concentration of 137Cs in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases. 
  
 
 
Figure 18. 48 hour average activity concentration of 241Pu in the ground-level air after a 
hypothetical reactor accident at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases.  
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Figure 19. Cumulative deposition of 90Sr 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 20. Cumulative deposition of 131I 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases.  
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Figure 21. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 22. Cumulative deposition of 241Pu 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, average of 365 cases.  
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Comparison of the 137Cs deposition from the release at the Pyhäjoki nuclear power plant  
calculated by the SILAM and SNAP models is shown in Fig. 23. The calculated 
deposition fields are very similar and especially the spatial pattern of the deposition 
with the characteristic tongue to the south. The deposition values on the tongue 
calculated by SNAP are a bit larger than the values calculated by SILAM, probably 
because of differences in precipitation fields in both models. 
 
Comparison of atmospheric concentrations from the release at the floating nuclear 
power plant on the Barents Sea, and calculated by the SILAM and SNAP models are 
shown in Figs. 24-27, for 90Sr, 131I, 137Cs and 241Pu, respectively. The corresponding 
depositions are shown in Figs. 28-31, for 90Sr, 131I, 137Cs and 241Pu, respectively. There 
are some common features in the calculated concentrations and deposition fields for all 
tested nuclides.  The spatial patterns of calculated concentrations and depositions, as 
well as predicted directions of transport are very similar.  In the SILAM calculations, 
there is always a gap in concentrations and depositions over Northern Finland, but not 
in SNAP calculations. Depositions calculated by SNAP are slightly higher than those 
calculated by SILAM and there is more lateral spread in the SNAP results in 
simulations of both accidents, most likely due to differences in precipitation fields. 
 . 
 
 
Figure 23. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 120 hours after a hypothetical reactor 
accident at Pyhäjoki, case 3 July 2010, comparison between SILAM (upper panel) and 
SNAP models (lower panel). 
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Figure 24. 48 hour average activity concentration of 90Sr after a hypothetical reactor 
accident at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison 
between SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel). 
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Figure 25. 48 hour average activity concentration of 131I after a hypothetical reactor 
accident at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison 
between SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel). 
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Figure 26. 48 hour average activity concentration of 137Cs after a hypothetical reactor 
accident at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison 
between SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel). 
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Figure 27. 48 hour average activity concentration of 241Pu after a hypothetical reactor 
accident at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison 
between SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel). 
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Figure 28. Cumulative deposition of 90Sr 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison between 
SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel).  
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Figure 29. Cumulative deposition of 131I 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison between 
SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel).  
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Figure 30. Cumulative deposition of 137Cs 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison between 
SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel).  
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Figure 31. Cumulative deposition of 241Pu 48 hours after a hypothetical reactor accident 
at Shtokmann gas field, Barents Sea, case 4 November 2010, comparison between 
SILAM (upper panel) and SNAP models (lower panel).  
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Comparison of modeled radionuclide concentrations with observations 
 
The annual 137Cs activity concentration in the ground-level air at Rovaniemi is 
presented in Figure 32. The measured maximum 137Cs activity concentration, 328 
?Bq/m³, occurred in 1986. We can now make a rough comparison of the observations 
and model simulations described earlier to assess the levels of these two exposure 
sources in Finnish Lapland north of Rovaniemi. The annual exposure in 1986 was 328 
?Bq/m³ multiplied with 365 days = 119720 ?Bq×d×m-³. To obtain the same exposure in 
two days an activity concentration of 119720 ?Bq×d×m-³ / 2 d = 59860 ?Bq×m-³ = 
0.060 Bq/m3 would be needed. The exposure of 48 hours activity concentration in the 
average case of 137Cs from Pyhäjoki (Fig. 4) would be 17-170 times higher than the 
exposure in 1986 assuming no protective measures were taken. In the case of the 
Shtokmann site (Fig. 17) the exposure would be 50 times or less higher than the 
exposure in 1986. 
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Figure 32. Measured annual average activity concentration of 137Cs in the ground-level 
air (?Bq/m³) at Rovaniemi 1965-2013. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This work once again shows how prevailing weather conditions are of the utmost 
importance in a case of an accidental radioactive release into the atmosphere. The 
direction of air flows settles the course of the emission plume. On one hand, the wind 
speed determines how quickly the emission plume is transported. On the other hand, the 
vertical and horizontal dispersion of the plume depends on the wind speed. This affects 
the concentrations of radioactive substances. Atmospheric radioactivity is removed from 
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the atmosphere by radioactive decay and by wet and dry deposition. Most radionuclides 
are bound to atmospheric aerosol particles. Dry deposition is important especially with 
large particles. Precipitation efficiently scavenges the radioactivity from the atmosphere 
to the ground, affecting the amount of the radioactive deposition.  
 
The following conclusions can be formulated based on presented results of the 
comparison between the SILAM and SNAP models: 
o Very similar spatial patterns for concentration and deposition for both models and 
for both examined cases. Directions of the transport are practically the same in the 
results of both models. 
o In case of SILAM simulation of hypothetical accident on the Barents Sea, there is 
always a gap in concentrations and depositions over Northern Finland, but not in 
case of SNAP. 
o Depositions calculated by SNAP look slightly higher than those calculated by 
SILAM and there is more lateral spread in the SNAP results in simulations of both 
accidents.   
o Precipitation is the most likely reason for small differences between SILAM and 
SNAP in calculated concentration and deposition fields. 
 
The calculated exposure to 137Cs in the ground-level air is an overestimation. People 
spend much of their time indoors and ventilation systems of buildings usually 
automatically provide some cover against atmospheric radioactivity. In addition, in an 
emergency situation people would be adviced to stay indoors and enhance the protection 
provided by their residences by shutting down ventilation systems and sealing doors and 
windows. 
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